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JOHNSON V. MORRILL

[20 C. (2d)

tinguished from the present proceeding, the property was
acquired for use by the United States Government in the
performance of a governmental function, and exclusive jurisdiction was consented to or ceded ;by the state and was exercised by the United States. [5] Land acquired by the United
States which is not subject to the exclusive legislative authority vested by the Constitution, remains subject to the jurisdiction of the state in matters not inconsistent with the free
and effective use of the land for the purpose for which it was
acquired. Further or exclusive authority may be ceded by
the state on any terms acceptable to the United States. (Fort
Leavenworth R. 00. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 [5 S. Ct. 995, 29 L.
Ed. 264] ; Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399 [16 S. Ct. 837,
40 L. Ed. 1015]; United States v. UnzelUta, supraj Surplus
Trading 00. v. Oook, supra; Oollins v. Yosemite 00., supra.)
[4b] There is no showing in the present proceedings that grants
of authority have been expressly conferred by cession or agreement. The United States cannot be compelled to accept the
burdens of exclusive jurisdiction along with the title to land
acquired for purposes not strictly within the classes designated
in the Constitution. (Silas Mason 00. v.Tax Oommission,
302 U. S. 186 [58 S. Ct. 233, 82 L. Ed. 187] ; Atkinson v.
State Tax Commission, 303 U. S. 20 [58 S. Ct. 419, 82 L. Ed.
621] .) By the Lanham Act the Pederal Government expressly
declined exclusive jurisdiction; and as to the project known
as "Navy 2" acquired under the earlier act, it does not appear
to have desired or to have exercised such exclusive jurisdiction.
There is therefore no sound basis upon which we may announce the conclusion that the United States has undertaken
such jurisdiction of the defense housing project known as
"Navy 2" as would deprive citizens residing thereon of the
elective franchise, as distinguished fro~ citizens residing
on .other projects who were expressly declared not to be
deemed deprived of their civil or political rights. Accordingly
we have concluded that the petitioner, Dorothy Johnson, is
also entitled to have her affidavit of registration accepted by
the respondent.
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed in each of said
proceedings.
Gibson, C.•J., Curti!': . .T .. F,dmonds. J., Carter, J., Traynor,

J., and Ward, J. pro tern., concurred.

t
June 1942]

rs.

BLANK V. COFFIN

F. No. 16693.

In Bank.

457

June' 24, 1942.1

CAROL BLANK, Appellant, v. IAN COFFIN et aI., Defendants; MERCANTILE ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Automobiles-Persons Liable-Lender-Possession by Em-

ployee-Permission.-If the evidence shows that an automobile was being driven by an employee of the owner at the time
of an accident, the jury may infer that the employee. was operating the automobile with the permission of the owner.

[2] Evidence-Inferences-Question of Fact.-If a jury can. rea-

' '.

sonably infer from primary facts that the material fact e.:<rists,
the party has introduced sufficient evidence to entitle him to
have the jury decide the issue. As to whether a particular inference can be drawn from certain evidence is a question of
law, but as to whether the inference shall be drawn in a given
case is a question of fact.
[3] Trial-"-Questions for Court and Jury-Instruction.-If evidence contrary to the existence of the fact. in issue 'is clear,
positive, uncontradicted, and of such a nature that it cannot
rationally be disbelieved, the court must instruct the jury that
the nonexistence of the fact has been established as a matter
of law.
Witnesses-Determination
of Credibility-Uncontradicted Tes-.
[4]
timony.-The jury is free to disbelieve witnesses even though
they are uncontradicted, if there is any rational ground for do-'
ing so. And in most cases they may disbelieve the evidence as
to the nonexistence of a primary fact and find that it does
exist as a basis of an inference of the fact in issue..
[5] Automobiles-Actions.....:..Directed Verdict-For Owner.-In· an
action against the employee-operator and the owner of an
automobile arising out of a collision at a time when the em.ployee-operator was not acting within the scope of his employment, it was error to direct a verdict for the owner where

[1] See 2 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 508.
,[2] See 10 Cal. Jur. 738; 29 Am. Jur. 165.
[3] Disregarding uncontradicted testimony, note, 8 A. L. R. 796.
See, also, 27 Cal. Jur. 184; 28 R. C. L. 660.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6] Automobiles, § 167(4); [2] Evidence, § 140; [3] Trial, § 125; [4J Witnesses, § 297; [5] Automobiles,§273a; [7] Evidence, § 156(5).
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from the fact of ownership and operation by an employee the
jury could infer that the car was being operated with the owner's permission, and where the. owner introduced evidence contrary to such inference but there were grounds on which such
evidence could be disbelieved.
[6] Id.-Persons Liable-Lender-Possession by Employee-Permission.-The fact that an employee was accompanied by a
friend in violati!l1,l of his employer's rules governing use of
company automobiles does not establish the want of permission to drive the car. That fact, while pertinent where the
passenger is injured and has knowledge of the rule, has no relevancy where a third person is injured.

[7] Evidence-Admissibility-Conditions At Other Times.--:-Evidence of the existence of a particular condition, relationship,
or status, including permisslOn to use an automobile, before
and after an act in question is admissible to indicate the existence of the same status, condition or relationship at the
time of the act. In an action involving the question of an employer's permission to an employee to operate a car for personal business, it is proper to show personal· use of the car
after the accident in question, knowledge thereof by the employee's superior and the failure to protest.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of .A.lameda County. Leon E. Gray, JUdge. Reversed.
Action against driver and owner of an automobile for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision.
Judgment in favor. of the owner pursuant to a directed verdict, reversed.
James R. Agee for Appellant.
Hagar, Crosby & Crosby and Carlyle C. Crosby for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On June 11, 1939, at about 4 a. m. an automobile belonging to the Mercantile Acceptance Corporation of
California, while being driven by Ian Coffin, one of its employees, collided with an automobile being driven by Lester F.
Kain, in which Mrs. Carol Blank was riding as a guest. Mrs.
Blank was injured and brought an action for damages against
Coffin and the Mercantile Acceptance Corporation, alleging
that Coffin was negligent and that he was driving the car with
the permission of its owner, the Acceptance Corporation. The
Mercantile Acceptance Corporation is engaged in the business

!
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6f financing automobile loans and maintains a branch office
in Oakland in charge of G. N. Stuperich. About three months
before the accident Coffin was hired as a field man .by Stuperich. His duties consisted principally in the exanunation and
repossession of automobiles, and his territory covered ,much
of the San Francisco Bay area. He was given the exclusive
use 6f a company car to facilitate his work. He kept the car
in the garage at his home in Berkeley free of charge to the
company; He had no fixed hours of employment and occasionally worked in the evenings. When he was hired Coffin was
furnished with a mimeographed manual of instructions providing :" Each field man 'or collector will be supplied with a
company. owned car. The employee to whom the car is assigned must see that it is kept in excellent condition at. all
times at a minimum expense. Please note· the following instructions: . . . The company does not allow employees operating company cars to pick up riders or carry passengers unless
they are employed by the company ... Company owned cars
must not be use4 by the employees· on their vacations." Coffin testified that when he was hired Stuperich told him orally
never to use the car for pleas1ll'e or person!t1 matters. He also
testified that he used the car on Sundays for his own pleasure
~ and made overnight trips in it from time to time for his own
pleasure but that at the time of the accident he was not on a
vacation. He stated that ~ach· week he reported the mileage
covered, including that covered on his personal business, but
his reports on gasoline consumed omitted gasoline purchased
for his' personal trips. Stuperich testified that he instructed
Coffin not to use the car for personal business and that before
the accident he severely reprimanded Coffin for taking the car
on a week-end pleasure trip and threatened to discharge him
in the event of another infraction. After a week's lay-off Coffin resumed work and possession of the car.
On the night of the accident Coffin and a friend attended a
social function in the company of two young women. They had
taken the young women home and were 'returning to Berkeley
when the accident occurred. Coffin was driving north on
Webster Street in Alameda, and Kain was driving south.
Coffin's car struck Kain's car on the right side between the
hood and the door. Coffin testified that Kain's car swerved
over the center line of the street into his path. Kain and other
witnesses for the plaintIff testified th,at Coffin's car swerved
across the center line of the road, came oyer to the west side,
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and then swung back toward the center, striking the Kain
car. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the Mercantile Acceptance Corporation, and ;the jury returned a verdict
against Coffin for $7,500. Plaintiff has appealed from the
judgment entered in favor of the Mercantile Acceptance Corporation upon the directed verdict.
- Section 402a of the Vehicle Code provides: "Every owner
of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or
injury to person or property resulting from negligence in
the operation of such motor vehicle, in the business of such
owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same
with the permission, express or implied,of such owner, and
the negligence of such person shall be imputed to the owner
for all purposes of civil damages." Section 402b limits this
liability to $5,000.
[1] If the evidence shows that an automobile was being
driven by an employee of the owner at the time of an accident, the jury may infer that the employee was operating
the automobile with the permission of the owner. (Bushnell v.
Tashiro, 115 Cal. App. 563 [2 P. (2d) 550]; McWhirt.er v.
Fuller, 35 Cal. App. 288 [170 Pac. 417] ; Pozzobon v. O'Donnell, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 151 [36 P. (2d) 236] ; Brown v. Ohevrolet. Motor 00.,39 Cal. App. 738 [179 Pac. 697] ; Wagnitz v.
Scharet.g, 89 Cal. App. 511 [265 Pac. 318]; West.berg v.
Willde, 14 Cal. (2d) 360 [94 P. (2d) 590]. See cases cited in
2 Cal. JUl'. 10-Yr. Supp. 508, sec. 326.) Defendant recognizes
that a jury may draw such an inference but contends that the
evidence introduced by it in thep:~esent case to show that Coffin
was driving the car without its permission was so clear, positive, and uncontradicted that the jury could not reasonably
conclude that it had given permission, express or implied, for
such use. Plaintiff concedes t1;1at Coffin was not acting within
the scope of his employment at the time the accident occurred
but contends that the evidence is sufficient to justify a finding
by the jury that at the time of the accident Coffin was operating the automobile with the implied permission of defendant
and that the directed verdict was therefore improper.
An inference is a conclusion as to the existence of a material fact that a jury may properly draw from the existence
of certain primary facts. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. secs. 1958,
1960, 1832; see cases cited in 10 Cal. Jur. 736-738, sec, 59.)
[2] It is not always possible for a party to a lawsuit to introduce evidence directly bearing upon the existence of a fact
that he is attempting to prove. The evidence available to him

4~

may serve only to establish the existence of certain primary
facts 'that are logically connected with' the material fact. If a
jury can reasonably infer from these primary facts that the
material fact exists, the party has introduced sufficient evidence to entitle him to have the jury decide the issue. The
jury is not compelled to draw the inference, however, even in
the absence- of contrary evidence and may refuse to do so.
Whether a particular inference can be drawn from certain
evidence is a question of law, but whether the inference shall
be drawn, in any given case, is a question of fact for the jury.
(See cases cited in 10 Cal. Jur. 738-739, sec. 60.)
[3] Usually, the opposing party introduces evidence as
to the nonexistence of the fact in issue, and the jury must
then determine the existence or nonexistence of the fact from
all the evidence before it. If the evidence contrary to the
existence of the fact is clear, positive, uncontradicted, and of
such a nature that it can not rationally be disbelieved, the
court must instruct the jury that the nonexistence of the fact
has been established as a matter of law. (Engst.rom v. Auburn
Aut.o Sales Oorp., 11 Cal. (2d) 64 [77 P. (2d) 1059]; Orouch
v. Gilmore Oil 00., 5 Cal. (2d) 330 [54 P. (2d) 709] ; Maupin
v. Solomon, 41 Cal. App. 323 [183 Pac. 198].) [4] The
jury, however, is the sole judge of. the credibility of the
witnesses (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1847; see cases cited
in 27 Cal., Jur. 182" sec. 156) and is free to disbelieve
them even though they are uncontradicted if there is any
rational ground for doing so. (Hinkle v. Southern Pacific 00.,
12 Cal. (2d) 691 [87 P. (2d) 349] ; Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn~
Mayer, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 556 [90 P.: (2d) 371]; Burke v.
Bank of America etc. Assn., 34 Cal. App. (2d) 594 [94 P;
(2d) 58]; People v. La Fleur, 42 Cal. App, (2d) 50 [108
P. (2d) 99] . See cases collected in 27 Cal. Jur. 184, sec.
156; 8 A. L. R. 796.) In most cases" therefore, the jury
is free to disbelieve the evidence as to the nonexistence of
the fact and to find that it does exist on the basis of the
inference. (Bushnell v. Tashirq, supra; Marke~ Street Ry. 00.
v. George, 116 Cal. App. 572, 576 [3 P. (2d) 41]; Day v.
General Petroleum Oorp., 32 Cal. App. (2d) 220 [89 P. (2d)
718].)
There are many reasons why a jury may refuse to believe a
witness. Section 1847 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
" A witness is presumed to speak the truth. This presumption,
however, may be repelled by the manner in which he testifies,
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by the character of his testimony, or by evidence affecting his
character for truth, honesty, or integrity, or his motives, or
by contradictory evidence j and the jury are the exclusive
judges of his credibility." Section 2061 (3) of the Code of
Civil Procedure provides: "That a witness false in one part of
his testimony is to be distrusted in others." In passing on the
credibility of a witness, the jury is entitled to consider his
interest in the result of the case. (See cases collected in 27 Cal.
Jur. 180, sec. 154.)
[5] The. applicatiOD:\of these well settled rules to the facts
of the present case makes it clear that the trial court erred in
directing a verdict for the defendant. (See Estate of Flood,
217 Cal. 763 [21 P. (2d) 579] ; Esta'te of Lances, 216 Cal. 397
[l{,P. (2d) 768].) The fact that the car was owned by defendant and was being driven by one of its employees was
sufficient to permit the jury to infer that the car was being ,
driven wi~h defendant's permission. When defendant introduced evidence contrary to such an inference in the testimony
o:l:Coffin and Stuperich,the issue of permission could be taken
from the jury and a verdict directed for the defendant only
if the testimony could not be rationally disbelieved. There
were several grounds on which the jury could disbelieve the
testimony. Both Stuperich and Coffin, employees of the defendant, had an interest in the outcome of the case since they
would naturally wish to remain in the good graces of their
employer. Coffin's testimony as to how the accident occurred
directly contradicted the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses,
and if the jury disbelieved Coffin in this respect, it could disbelieve him in all respects. The testimony of Coffin and Stuperich revealed the following facts that would justify the jury
in concluding that Coffin was driving the automobile with
the tacit permission of the defendant: Coffin was given exclusive possession of the automobile; he kept it in his own
garage without charge to the company; the manual of instructions that he received forbade the use of the car on vacations, but did not forbid its use for personal matters j the
company could determine that Doffin was habitually using the
car for his personal business by checking his mileage reports
against his gasoline reports; Coffin was not discharged after
discovery of his use of the car on a week-end trip and was
allowed to resume possession of it after a short lay-off. [6]
The fact that Coffin was accompanied by a friend in violation
of the rules of the com:pany' could not establish that he did
not have permission to drive the car. This fact might be perti-

,

nent if the passenger were injured and :had knowledge of the
rule (Albers v. Shell Company, 104 Cal. App. 733 [286 Pac~
752] ), but it has no relevancy where a third person is injured.
(Gibbons v. Naritoka, 102 Cal. App. 669 [283 Pac. 84'5] j Nord
v. West Michigan Flooring Co., 238 Mich. 669, [214 'N. W,
236] ; Wright v. Maddox (Tex. Civ. App.) 288 S. W.560.)
[7] Plaintiff also contends· that the trial court erred in
refusing to permit her to question Coffin and Stuperich concerning Coffin's personal use of the' car after the accident an(l
Stuperich's knowledge thereof and failure to protest. Defen7
dant contends that evidence of circumstances after the accident cannot be used to estab~ish that Coffin was driving the
car with the permission of defendant at the time of the accident, and relies upon cases holding that evidence of precautions taken after an accident are not admissible.to show a
negligent condition at the time of the accident. (See cases
cited in 10 Cal. Jur. 829-830, sec. 115.) These cases, however,
are not analogous to the present one. Evidence of the existence
of a particular condition, relationship, or status, including
permission to use an automobile, before' and after an act in
question is admissible to indicate the e.xisteIuie of the same
status, condition, or relationship at the time of the act. (Chou,~ inard v~ WOOldridge, 102 Conn. 66 [127 Atl. 908] j Walker v~
Klopp, .99 Neb. 794 [157 N. W. 962, L. R. A.1916E, 1292] ;
Leonard v. Kreider, 51 Ohio App. 474 [1 N. E, (2d) 956]; see
Snowwhite v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co", 344 Mo ..705 [127
S. W. (2d) 718] j see cases cited in WigmorejEvidence (3rd
ed.}secs. 382, 377 j 10 Cal. Jur. 830, note 9, 828-829, sec. 114;
32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1117 et seq.) In the present case the testimony. of .Coffin and Stuperich revealed facts that would jus.
tify the jury's concluding that Coffin had permIssion to use
the car fo'r personal business before the accident, and plaintiff should have been permitted to question them concerning
Coffin's pt)rmission to use the car for his personal business
after the accident for the purpose of indicating that the same
relationship existed at the time of the accident.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds,J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Concurring.-I concur in the conclusion
reached in the majority opinion but ~annot agree with. the
following legal principle stated therein:
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"If the evidence contrary to thc existence of the fact is
clear, positive, uncontradicted, and of such a nature that it
can not rationally be disbelieved, the court must instruct the
jury that the non-existence of the fact has been established
as a matter of law." That statement is inconsistent with other
principles enunciated in the opinion.
It is there said: "If a jury can reasonably infer from these
primary facts that the material fact exists, the party has introduced sufficient evidence to entitle him to have the jury decide the issue. The jury is not compelled to draw the inf-erence, however, even in the absence of contrary evidence and
may refuse to do so. -lV:hether a particular inference can be
drawn from certain evidence is a qltestion of law, bttt whether
the inference shall be drawn, in any given case, is a question
of fact for the .fury." (Italics added.)
Also: "Usually, the opposing party introduces evidence as
to the non-existence of the fact in issue, and the .fury must
then determine the existence or non-existence of the fact from
all the evidence before it." (Italics added.)
"The .fury, however, is the sole .fudge of the crcd£bility of
the witnesses ... and is free to dl:sbelieve them even though
they are uncontradiCted if there is any rational ground for
doing so." (Italics added.)
It seems illogical to me to say, that if a jury may reasonably
infer from the primary facts the existence of the material
fact, the case may then be decided by the .fury, but that evidence contrary to the inferred fact destroys the inference if
it is clear, positive, uncontradicted, and cannot be disbelieved.
The query at once arises, disbelieved by whom? The jury may
or may not draw that inference as it chooses, but .immediately
that it is determined as a matter of law that it may be drawn
by the jury, it is evidence in the case, equal in weight and
value with any other evidence. Whatever evidence may be introduced by the opponent does nothing more than create a
conflict in the evidence which must be resolved by the trier of
fact. That conclusion necessarily stems from the rule stated
in the majority opinion that the jury is the sole jUdge of the
credibility of witnesses. What difference can it make On appeal
where matters of law alone are considered whether the evidence opposing the inference is Clear, positive and uncoutra- •
dieted ~ It is still within the province of the trier of fact to
disbelieve such evidence, and if it does, the inference stands
unimpeached.. If the jury is the sole judge of the credibility
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of the witnesses, this court cannot say as a matter of law that
this evidence or that evidence, is clear, positive, uncontradicted and cannot be disbelieved. The very fact that the jury
finds in favor of the inference and against such evidence conclusively shows that it is not clear, or uncontradicted or positive, or cannot be disbelieved. The jury necessarily must have
found it unreliable because of one of those factors.
In my opinion, the true rule with reference to the effect of
inferences in a case is, that this court's function begins and
'ends with the determination of the sole question of whether
a certain inference may be drawn from certain evidence. That
question is one of law. If the facts do not justify the inference, it cannot be drawn, and the one relying upon the purported inference must fail. If, however, it may be said that
the inference reasonably may be drawn, then it becomes the
sole function of the jury to decide whether or not it shall
draw the inference, and whether or not opposing evidence'
prevails over it. It may, without qualification, weigh that
inference against any and all evidence opposing it of whatever character or nature. Its conclusion on the completion of
that process is final and conclusive.
The statement that evidence contrary to the existence of
the fact established by the inference may overcome the inference as a matter of law, if clear, positive, uncontradicted and
of such a nature that it cannot be disbelieved, cannot stand
in the face of the principles that an inference once permissible, is evidence, and that the jury is the exclusive judge of
the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
Furthermore, it should be observed that the rule stated in
effect declares that direct evidence is of greater weight or
value than indirect or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial
evidence is nothing more than one or more inferences drawn
from a series of proven facts. It is entitled to be given the
force equal to direct evidence. (10 Cal. JUl'. 1157.)
The legal test as to the existence of whether an inference
arises is stated in section 1960 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
"An inference must be founded:
"1. On a fact legally proved; and,
"2. On such a deduction from that fact as is warranted
by a consideration of the usual propensities or passions of
men, the particular propensities or passions of the person
whose act is in question, the course of business, or the course
of nature." It is for the court to apply that test to determine
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whether an inference may be reasonably drawn from any
given facts:
Adherence to the principles above-stated admits of only one
possible limitation to the rule abovi:l-stated. If the credibility
of the evidence in opposition to the inference is beyond any
question when such evidence is subjected to any of the tests
of credibility, then it might be said to be conclusive on the
trier of fact. It is at once apparent that that limitation does
not apply to oral testimony for the reason that one of the
tests of credibility is the demeanor of the witness and his
manner of testifying (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1847) ;~the observation of that factor may be made only by the trier of
fact. It necessarily cannot 'be determined by an appellate
court. It is conceivable that under proper- circumstances documentary evidence might be conclusive, but the instances would
be rare. It is doubtful if the physical circumstances would
,ever be conclusive inasmuch as their effectiveness is practically invariably dependent upon inferences that may arise
therefrom, and as we have seen, the trier of fact mayor may
not draw those inferences. The statutes indicate the rarity of
conclusive evidence. They provide:
"Conclusive or unanswerable evidence is that which the
law does not permit to be contradicted. For example, the
reCOrd of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be contradicted by the parties to it." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1837.)
"No evidence is by law made conclusive or unanswerable,
unless so declared by this code." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1978.)
The cases, Engstrom v.Auburn Auto Sales Corp., 11 Cal.
(2d) 64 [77 P. (2d) 1059J ; Crouch v. Gilmore Oil Co., 5 Cal.
(2d) 330 [54 P. (2d) 709J; and Maupin v. Solomon, 41 Cal.
App. 323 [183 Pac. 198J, have added only confusion to an
otherwise clear and concise rule. They should not be followed, much less extended. They fail to give to an inference
its proper place in the law, and entirely overlook the principle that the trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight
of the evidence and credibility of witnesses.
In my opinion the evidence in the case at bar is sufficient
to justify the inference that defendant Coffin was driving
the automobile involved in the accident with, the permission
of defendant Mercantile Acceptance Corporation, and this
issue should have been submitted to the jury. The judgment
entered on the order granting a directed verdict as to the last
named defendant should therefore be reversed.
Shenk, J., concurred.

[8. F. No. 16678. In Bank. June 30,1942.]
THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA et aI., Petitioners, v. THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
Respondent.
[1] Certiorari-Jurisdiction-Supreme Court.-The Supreme

Court has jurisdiction over a certiorari proceeding to annul a
contempt order, instituted within 30 days after the denial by
a District Court of Appeal of a writ of prohibition to restrain
entertainment of the contempt proceeding.

.,'

[2] Prohibition-Determination-Res Judicata.-It cannot be said
that the action of the District Court of Appeal in denying
without opinion a writ of prohibition to restrain a contempt
proceeding is res judicata on the issues in a certiorari proceeding 'to annul the contempt order made therein, since the writ
may have been denied for reasons other than that the claini
was without merit. The rule that the ex parte denial without
wI'itten opinion of an application for such writ is. a final adjudication of the facts in the petition, is inapplicable in the
circumstances.
[8] Certiorari-Jurisdiction-Supreme Court.-The Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over a certiorari proceeding· instituted within
30 days following the voluntary withdrawal, prior to judgment, of a similar proceeding in a District Court of Appeal.
In such case, Const., art. VI, sec. 4c, relating to the time when
decisions of the District Courts of Appeal become final, is inapplicable.
[4]

Id.-Hearing~Moot Questions.-A certiorari proceeding to review an order adjudging guilt of contempt for disobedience of
a writ of mandate directing reinstatement of civil service em~
ployees and payment of salaries is rio,t rendered moot by the
adoption by one respondent of a resolutidn of intention to comply with the writ, where the contempt order affects as well
other parties one of whom is directly affected by the main
issue, the payment of salaries.

McK.Dig, References: [1, 3] Certiorari, § 50; [2] Prohibitiob.,'
§ 59(1); [4] Certiorari, § 83; [5] Civil Service, § 14; [6] Mandamus, §106; Civil Service, §14; [7,8] Contempt, §81; [9] Contempt, § 78.

